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Abstract1
Why groups of individuals sometimes exhibit collective ‘wisdom’ and other times mal-2
adaptive ‘herding’ is an enduring conundrum. Here we show that this apparent conflict is3
regulated by the social learning strategies deployed. We examined the patterns of human4
social learning through an interactive online experiment with 699 participants, varying both5
task uncertainty and group size, then used hierarchical Bayesian model-ftting to identify6
the individual learning strategies exhibited by participants. Challenging tasks elicit greater7
conformity amongst individuals, with rates of copying increasing with group size, leading to8
high probabilities of herding amongst large groups confronted with uncertainty. Conversely,9
the reduced social learning of small groups, and the greater probability that social informa-10
tion would be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated ‘wisdom of the crowd’ eﬀects11
in other circumstances. Our model-based approach provides evidence that the likelihood of12
collective intelligence versus herding can be predicted, resolving a longstanding puzzle in13
the literature.14
2
Understanding themechanisms that account for accurate collective decision-making amongst15
groups of animals – ‘collective intelligence’ – has been a central focus of animal behaviour re-16
search1–5. There are a large number of biological examples showing that collectives of poorly17
informed individuals can achieve a high performance in solving cognitive problems under un-18
certainty6–10. Although these findings suggest fundamental cognitive benefits of grouping11,19
there is also a long-standing recognition, especially for humans, that interacting individuals may20
sometimes be overwhelmed by the ‘extraordinary popular delusions and madness of crowds’12.21
Herd behaviour (i.e. an alignment of thoughts or behaviours of individuals in a group) occurs22
because individuals imitate each other13–15, even if each is a rational decision-maker16. Imita-23
tion is thought to be a cause of financial bubbles12;17, ‘groupthink’18 and volatility in cultural24
markets19;20. More generally, interdependence between individual decisions may undermine the25
wisdom of crowds eﬀect21 (but see22), whilst potential disadvantages of information transfer are26
well-recognised in the biological literature23;24. It seems that information transmission among27
individuals, and making decisions collectively, is a double-edged sword: combining decisions28
may provide the benefits of collecitve intelligence, but at the same time, increase the risk of an29
informational cascade16. Collectively, an understanding of whether and, if so, how it is possible30
to prevent or reduce the risk of maladaptive herding, while concurrently keeping or enhancing31
collective intelligence, is largely lacking.32
A balance between using individual and social information may play a key role in deter-33
mining the trade-oﬀ between collective wisdom and ‘madness’25. If individuals are too reliant34
on copying others’ behaviour, any idea, even a maladaptive one, can propagate in the social35
group through positive feedbacks2;26. For instance, disproportionally strong positive responses36
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to recruitment signals in social insects have been shown to trap the whole colony to exploit a37
suboptimal, out-dated resource24;27. Likewise, conformity-biased transmission in humans and38
other animals can potentially lead groups to converge on a maladaptive behaviour16;23;28;29. On39
the other hand, however, if individuals completely ignore social information so as to be indepen-40
dent, they will fail to exploit the benefits of aggregating information through social interactions.41
The extent to which individuals should use social information should fall between these two42
extremes. Evolutionary models predict that the balance between independence and interdepen-43
dence in collective decision-making may be changeable, contingent upon the individual-level44
flexibility and inter-individual variability associated with the social learning strategies deployed45
in diverse environmental states28;30;31.46
Experimental studies report that animals (including humans) increase their use of social in-47
formation as the returns from asocial learning become more unreliable32–37, whilst theory and48
data suggest that the benefits to individuals of social learning increase with group size34;38–42.49
Selectivity in the predicted use of social information may impact on collective decision-making50
because slight diﬀerences in the parameter values of social information use are known to be able51
to alter qualitatively the collective behavioural dynamics1;2;5;43;44. Therefore, researchers should52
expect populations to exhibit a higher risk of being trapped with maladaptive behaviour with53
increasing group size and decreasing reliability of asocial learning (and concomitant increased54
reliance on social learning).55
From the viewpoint of the classic wisdom of crowds theory, increasing group size may in-56
crease collective accuracy45–48. The relative advantage of the collective over solitary individuals57
may also be highlighted by increased task diﬃculty, because there would be more room for the58
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performance of diﬃcult tasks to be improved compared to easier tasks in which high accuracy59
can be achieved by asocial learning only. To understand the collective decision performance of60
social learners fully requires fine-grained quantitative studies of social learning strategies and61
their relations to collective dynamics, linked to sophisticated computational analysis.62
The aims of this study were twofold. First, we set to test the hypothesis that the circumstances63
under which collective decision making will generate ‘wisdom’ can be predicted with knowledge64
of the precise learning strategies individuals deploy, through a combination of experimentation65
and theoretical modelling. The choice of an abstract decision-making task allowed us to imple-66
ment a computational modelling approach, which has been increasingly deployed in quantitative67
studies of animal social learning strategies35;49–51. In particular, computational modelling al-68
lowed us to conduct a parametric description of diﬀerent information-gathering processes and69
to estimate the parameter values at an individual-level resolution. This approach allows us to70
characterise the complex relationship between individual-level decision, learning strategies and71
collective-level behavioural dynamics.72
Second, we added resolution to our analyses by manipulating both task uncertainty and group73
size in our web-based experiments with adult human subjects, predicting that these factors would74
induce heavier use of social information in humans, and thereby alter the balance between col-75
lective intelligence and the risk of inflexible herding. To do this, we focused on human groups76
exposed to a simple gambling task called a multi-player ‘multi-armed bandit’, where both asocial77
and social sources of information were available35;51;52. Through development of an interactive,78
web-based collective decision-making task, and use of hierarchical Bayesian statistical meth-79
ods in fitting our computational model to the experimental data, we identify the individual-level80
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learning strategies of participants as well as quantify variation in diﬀerent learning parameters,81
allowing us to conduct an informed exploration of the population-level outcomes. The results82
provide clear evidence that the collective behavioural dynamics can be predicted with knowledge83
of human social learning strategies.84
Below, we firstly deploy agent-based simulation to illustrate how the model parameters re-85
lating to social learning can in principle aﬀect the collective-level behavioural dynamics. The86
simulation provides us with precise, quantitative predictions concerning the complex relation-87
ship between individual behaviour and group dynamics. Second, we present the findings of88
a multi-player web-based experiment with human participants that utilises the gambling task89
framework. Applying a hierarchical Bayesian statistical method, we estimated the model’s pa-90
rameters for each of 699 diﬀerent individuals, allowing us to (i) examine whether and, if so, how91
social information use is aﬀected by diﬀerent group size and task uncertainty, and (ii) whether92
and how social-information use aﬀects both collective intelligence and the risk of maladaptive93
herding.94
1 Results95
1.1 The relationship between social learning and the collective behaviour96
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the average decision accuracy and individual-level social97
information use obtained from our individual-based model simulations, highlighting the trade-98
oﬀ between accuracy and flexibility of collective decision-making. When the mean conformity99
exponent is small (i.e.  = .³i i/_individuals = 1), large groups are able to recover the decision100
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accuracy quickly as do small groups after the location of the optimal option has been switched,101
whereas overall improvement by increasing group size in decision accuracy is subtle when the102
average social learning weight is also small (i.e.  = .³i³t i;t/_.individuals  rounds/ = 0:3;103
Figure 1A and 1C). On the other hand, when both the conformity exponent  and the social104
learning weight  are large, average performance is no longer monotonically improving with in-105
creasing group size, and it is under these circumstances that the strong herding eﬀect becomes106
prominent (Figure 1D). Although the high conformity bias with low social learning weight makes107
large groups more accurate before the environment changes, larger groups are less flexible in per-108
formance recovery (Figure 1B). The patten is robust for other parameter regions (Supplementary109
Figure 2).110
Figure 2 indicates that when both  and  are large the collective choices converged either on111
the good option or on one of the poor options almost randomly, regardless of the option’s quality,112
and that once individuals start converging on an option the population gets stuck. As a result,113
the distribution of the groups’ average performance over the replications becomes a bimodal114
‘U-shape’. Interestingly, however, the maladaptive herding eﬀect remains relatively weak in115
smaller groups (see Figure 1D; the dotted line). This is because the majority of individuals in116
smaller groups (i.e. two individuals out of three) are more likely to break the cultural inertia by117
simultaneously exploring another option by chance than are the majority in larger groups (e.g.118
six out of ten).119
In summary, the model simulation suggests an interaction between social learning weight120
 and conformity exponent  on decision accuracy and the risk of inflexible herding. When121
the conformity exponent is not too large, increasing group size can increase decision accuracy122
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while concurrently retaining decision flexibility across a broad range of the mean social learning123
weights. When the conformity bias becomes large, however, the risk of inflexible herding arises,124
and, when both social learning parameters are large, collective intelligence is rare and inflexible125
herd behaviour dominates.126
1.2 Collective performance of human participants127
Figure 3A shows behavioural dynamics of human participants in diﬀerent group sizes and dif-128
ferent task uncertainty conditions (see Supplementary Figure 3 for each group’s behaviour). The129
average decision performance of collectives (i.e. group size g 2) exceeded that of solitary in-130
dividuals (i.e. group size = 1) in the Moderate-uncertainty condition (i.e. the 95% Bayesian131
CI of t exceeds 0 at regions t Ë [9; 40] and [67; 70]; Figure 3B). In other uncertainty condi-132
tions, no global positive eﬀect of grouping was observed, suggesting that collective intelligence133
was prominent only in the Moderate-uncertainty condition. However, the main eﬀect of group134
size was positive in the post-change period of the Low-uncertainty condition (mean and the 95%135
Bayesian CI of !2 = 0.67 [0.44, 0.91]; Table 1), suggesting that the average performance of large136
groups (e.g. 12 f group size f 16) were better, and hence more flexible, than smaller groups137
and solitaries (Figure 3A). On the other hand, in the Moderate-uncertainty condition, the aver-138
age performance of the collectives dropped below that of the solitaries after the environmental139
change (i.e. t < 0 at a region t Ë [42; 45]; Figure 3B). Also, the main eﬀect of group size140
was negative in the post-change period (mean and the 95% Bayesian CI of !2 = -0.26 [-0.44,141
-0.11]; Table 1), suggesting that larger groups were more likely to get stuck in the out-dated op-142
tion in the Moderate-uncertainty condition. In the High-uncertainty condition, the main eﬀect of143
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group size was positive in the prior-change period and negative post-change (mean and the 95%144
Bayesian CIs are !1 = 0.07 [0.00, 0.15] and !2 = -0.10 [-0.17, -0.02]; Table 1), although the145
eﬀect size was too small to diﬀerentiate performances of diﬀerent group sizes visually (Figure146
3A). Using monetary earnings as an outcome variable of decision performance did not change147
our conclusions qualitatively (supporting Supplementary Figure 4 and Supplementary Table 2).148
Our phenomenological model regression established that manipulating both task uncertainty149
and group size indeed aﬀected the collective decision dynamics. Below, we address whether or150
not the pattern could be explained with knowledge of human social learning strategies estimated151
through our learning and decision-making computational model.152
1.3 Estimation of human social information use153
Using posterior estimation values obtained by the hierarchical Bayesian model fitting method154
(Table 2), we were able to categorise the participants as deploying one of three diﬀerent learn-155
ing strategies based on their fitted conformity exponent values; namely, the ‘positive frequency-156
dependent copying’ strategy (i ¸ 0), the ‘negative-frequency dependent copying’ strategy157
(i ~ 0) and the ‘random choice’ strategy (i ù 0). Note that we could not reliably detect158
the ‘weak positive’ frequency-dependent strategy (0 < i f 1) due to the limitation of statisti-159
cal power (Supplementary Figure 5). Some individuals whose ‘true’ conformity exponent fell160
between zero and one would have been categorised as exhibiting a random choice strategy (Sup-161
plementary Figure 7). Individuals identified as exhibiting a positive frequency-dependent copiers162
were mainly those whose conformity exponent was larger than one (i > 1).163
Figure 4A show the estimated frequencies of diﬀerent learning strategies. Generally speak-164
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ing, participants were more likely to utilize a positive frequency-dependent copying strategy165
than the other two strategies (the 95% Bayesian CI of the intercept of the GLMM predicting the166
probability to use the positive frequency-dependent copying strategy is above zero, [1.05, 2.50];167
Supplementary Table 4). We found that positive frequency-dependent copying decreased with168
increasing task uncertainty (the 95% Bayesian CI of task uncertainty eﬀect is below zero, [-1.88,169
-0.25]; Supplementary Table 4). We found no clear eﬀects of either the group size, age or gender170
on adoption of the positive frequency-dependent copying strategy, except for the negative inter-171
action eﬀect between age and task uncertainty (the 95% Bayesian CI of the age  uncertainty172
interaction = [-1.46, -0.15]; Supplementary Table 4).173
We also investigated the eﬀects of group size and task uncertainty on the fitted individual174
parameter values. We found that the individual mean social learning weight parameter (i.e. i =175
.
³
t i;t/_.total rounds/) increased with group size (the 95~ Bayesian CI = [0.15, 0.93]; Figure176
4B; Supplementary Table 5), and decreased with uncertainty (the 95~ Bayesian CI = [-0.98,177
-0.22]), and age of subject (the 95~ Bayesian CI = [-0.36, -0.02]). However, the negative eﬀects178
of task uncertainty and age disappeared when we focused only on i of the positive frequency-179
dependent copying individuals, and only the positive eﬀect of the group size was confirmed180
(Supplementary Table 6; Supplementary Figure 6). It is worth noting that the meaning of the181
social learning weight is diﬀerent between these three diﬀerent strategies: The social learning182
weight regulates positive reactions to the majorities’ behaviour for positive frequency-dependent183
copiers, whereas it regulates avoidance of the majority for negative-frequency dependent copiers,184
and determines the probability of random decision-making for the random choice strategists.185
The individual conformity exponent parameter i increased with task uncertainty (the 95~186
10
Bayesian CI = [0.38, 1.41]), but we found no significant eﬀects of group size, age, gender or187
interactions (Figure 4C; Supplementary Table 7). These results were qualitatively unchanged188
when we focused only on the positive frequency-dependent copying individuals (Supplementary189
Table 8; Supplementary Figure 6).190
We observed extensive individual variation in social information use. The greater the task’s191
uncertainty, the larger were individual variances in both the mean social learning weight and the192
conformity exponent (the 95~ Bayesian CI of the GLMM’s variation parameter for i was [1.11,193
1.62] (Supplementary Table 5) and for i was [1.07, 1.54] (Supplementary Table 7)). This was194
confirmed when focusing only on the positive frequency-dependent copying individuals: The195
Bayesian 95% CIs were [1.14, 1.80] (Supplementary Table 6) and [0.71, 1.10] (Supplementary196
Table 8), respectively.197
The manner in which individual variation in social-information use of positive frequency-198
dependent copying individuals changes over time is visualised in Figure 5. The social learn-199
ing weights generally decreased with experimental round. However, some individuals in the200
Moderate- and the High-uncertain conditions accelerated rather than decreased their reliance on201
social learning over time. Interestingly, those accelerating individuals tended to have a larger202
conformity exponent (Supplementary Figure 5). In addition, the time-dependent i;t in our al-203
ternative model generally increased with experimental round in the Moderate- and the High-204
uncertainty conditions (Supplementary Figure 10), although the fitting of i;t in the alternative205
model was relatively unreliable (Supplementary Figure 9). These findings suggest that con-206
formists tended to use asocial learning at the outset (i.e. exploration asocially) but increasingly207
started to conform as the task proceeded (i.e. exploitation socially).208
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Extensive variation in the temporal dynamics of the social learning weight i;t was also found209
for the negative-frequency dependent copying individuals but not found for random choice indi-210
viduals (Supplementary Figure 5). Individuals deploying a random choice strategy exhibited a211
i;t that approached to zero, indicating that their decision-making increasingly relied exclusively212
on the softmax choice rule, rather than unguided random choices, as the task proceeded.213
No significant fixed eﬀects were found in other asocial learning parameters such as the learn-214
ing rate i and the mean inverse temperature i = .³t i;t/_.total rounds/ (Supplementary Table215
9, Supplementary Table 10 and Supplementary Figure 6).216
In summary, our experiments on adult humans revealed asymmetric influences of increasing217
task uncertainty and increasing group size on the social learning parameters. The conformity218
exponent increased with task uncertainty on average but the proportion of positive frequency-219
dependent copying individuals showed a corresponding decrease, due to the extensive individual220
variation emerging in the High-uncertain condition. Conversely, group size had a positive eﬀect221
on the mean social learning weight, but did not aﬀect conformity.222
1.4 Social learning strategies explain the collective dynamics223
The post-hoc simulation provides statistical predictions on how likely it is, given the fitted learn-224
ing model parameters, that groups of individuals make accurate decisions and that they exhibit225
inflexible herding. Figure 3C shows the change over time in performance with diﬀerent group226
sizes and diﬀerent uncertainty conditions, generated by the post-hoc simulation (see also Sup-227
plementary Figure 3). The trajectories of the simulated dynamics recovered nicely the pattern228
observed in the experiment (Figure 3A and 3C), suggesting that the strategic changes in the229
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individual-level social information use (Figure 4) could explain the collective-level behavioural230
pattern.231
Figure 3D shows that larger groups are more likely to make accurate decisions than are232
both small groups and solitaries in the period prior to change across all uncertainty conditions,233
suggesting collective intelligence was operating. In the post-change period, however, perfor-234
mance diﬀered between the conditions. In the Low-uncertainty condition, where we found that235
the participants were most likely to have a relatively weak positive frequency-dependence (i.e.236
 = 1:65), large groups performed better than did small groups over 59.5% of total 10,000237
repetitions. However, in the Moderate-uncertainty condition, where we found that participants238
were most likely to have strong positive frequency dependence (  = 3:00, c.f. 1.65 in the Low-239
uncertainty condition), the large groups were more likely to get stuck on the suboptimal option,240
and hence the small groups performed better than did the large groups over 69.5% of repetitions241
(Figure 3D). The decision accuracy did not substantially diﬀer with group size in the post-change242
period in the High-uncertainty condition although the large groups performed slightly better than243
did the small groups (50.8% of the repetitions).244
Interestingly, although their relatively low conformity biases, there were some groups in the245
Low-uncertainty condition that seemed to exhibit herding (the ‘humped’ area at the lefthand side246
to the peak of the performance distribution in the post-change period; Figure 3D). This might be247
due to the lower softmax exploration rates among social learners in the Low-uncertainty condition248
(i.e. both <0 and  were large; Table 2): the whole population gets stuck because all individuals249
are very exploitative on their past experience.250
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2 Discussion251
We investigated whether and how human social learning strategies regulate the trade-oﬀ between252
collective intelligence and inflexible herding behaviour using a collective learning-and-decision-253
making task combined with simulation and model fitting. We examined whether manipulat-254
ing the reliability of asocial learning and group size would aﬀect the use of social information,255
and thereby alter the collective human decision dynamics, as suggested by our computational256
model simulation. Although a theoretical study has suggested that reliance on social learning257
and conformity bias would play a role in collective dynamics2;5;53, thus far no empirical studies258
have quantitatively investigated the population-level consequences of these two diﬀerent social259
learning processes. Our high-resolution, model-based behavioural analysis using a hierarchi-260
cal Bayesian statistics enabled us to identify individual-level patterns and variation of diﬀerent261
learning parameters and to explore their population-level outcomes. The results provide quanti-262
tative support for our hypothesis that the collective decision performance can be predicted with263
quantitative knowledge of social learning strategies.264
Overall, our individual-based computational model recovered the behavioural pattern sug-265
gested by the phenomenological regression (Figure 3). Using the post-hoc simulation with266
individually-fit model parameters, we confirmed that in the Low-uncertainty condition, where267
individuals had weaker positive frequency bias (i.e.  ù 1:65), larger groups were able to be268
more accurate than smaller groups while retaining flexibility in their decision-making9, although269
their low asocial exploration rates seemed to undermine the potential flexibility. However, in the270
Moderate- and the High-uncertain conditions where individuals had the higher conformity ex-271
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ponent parameters (i.e.  ù 3:0 and 2:7, respectively), larger groups performed better prior to272
environmental change but were vulnerable to getting stuck with an out-dated maladaptive option273
post change. Therefore, the changes in the level of conformity in human individuals34;41 indeed274
incurred a trade-oﬀ between the collective intelligence eﬀect and the risk of inflexible herding.275
Although the social learning weight increased with increasing group size, the overall mean276
value was i ù 0:3 (Figure 4B; Supplementary Figure 5; Supplementary Figure 6) and it de-277
creased on average as the task proceeded (Figure 5). This implies a weaker social than asocial278
influence on decision-making as reported in several other experimental studies35;54–56 although279
evolutionary models tend to predict heavier reliance on social learning than experimental studies280
report57;58. Thanks to this relatively weak reliance of social learning, the kind of extreme herding281
that would have blindly led a group to any option regardless of its quality, such as the ‘symmetry282
breaking’ known in trail-laying ant collective foraging systems2;5;26, did not occur (Figure 2).283
Individual diﬀerences in rates of exploration might also help to mitigate potential herding.284
Although a majority of participants adopted a positive frequency-dependent copying strategy,285
some individuals exhibited negative frequency dependence or random decision-making (Figure286
4A). The random choice strategy was associated with more exploration than the other strate-287
gies, because it led to an almost random choice at a rate i, irrespective of the options’ quality.288
Negative-frequency dependent copying individuals could also be highly exploratory. These indi-289
viduals tended to avoid choosing an option upon which other people had converged and would ex-290
plore the other two ‘unpopular’ options. Interestingly, in the High-uncertain condition the mean291
social learning weights of the negative-frequency dependent copying individuals ( i ù 0:5) were292
larger than that of the other two strategies ( i ù 0:1, Supplementary Figure 5), indicating that293
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these individuals engaged in such majority-avoiding exploration relatively frequently. Such a294
high variety in social information use59–62 and exploratory tendencies would prevent individuals295
from converging on a single option, leading to a mitigation of herding but concurrently dimin-296
ishing the decision accuracy in high-uncertainty circumstances (Figure 3).297
A methodological advantage of using computational models to study social learning strate-298
gies is its explicitness of assumptions about the temporal dynamics of behaviour, which enabled299
us to distinguish diﬀerent learning strategies63–65. For example, very exploitative asocial re-300
inforcement learners (i.e. for whom exploitation parameter i;t is large and the social learning301
weight i;t is nearly zero, as seen in the Low-uncertainty condition) and conformity-biased social302
learners (where the conformity exponent i is large and i;t is positive, as seen in the Moderate-303
uncertain condition) would eventually converge on the same option, resulting in the same final304
behavioural steady state. However, how they explored the environment, as well as how they re-305
acted to the other individuals in the same group, are significantly diﬀerent and they could produce306
qualitatively diﬀerent collective temporal dynamics.307
However, our computational model could not fully capture other, potentially more sophisti-308
cated forms of social learning strategies that participants might deploy, which might be a reason309
for the seemingly low rate of social learning observed in the experiment compared to theory57;58.310
Indeed, the post-hoc simulation sometimes failed to recover the observed behavioural trajecto-311
ries. In particular, experimental groups with n = 12, n = 16, and one group in n = 9, in the312
Low-uncertainty condition performed very well, exceeding the 95% CIs of the post-hoc simu-313
lation after the environmental change (Supplementary Figure 3). This indicates that collective314
behaviour in these groups was more flexible than our model predicted. Further empirical studies315
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that consider a wider range of possible social learning strategies, e.g. ‘copy-rapidly-increasing-316
option’ strategy66 or Bayesian updating57;67, are needed to explore computational underpinnings317
of social learning and collective behaviour.318
The Internet-based experimentation allowed us to conduct a real-time interactive behavioural319
task with larger subject pools than a conventional laboratory-based experiment. This enabled us320
not only to quantify the individual-level learning-and-decision processes68 but also to map these321
individual-level processes on to the larger-scale collective behaviour5;15;20. Although there are322
always questions about the validity of participants’ behaviour when recruited via web-based tools,323
we believe that the computational modelling approach coupled with higher statistical power due324
to the large sample size, compensates for any drawbacks. The fact that our learning model could325
approximate the participants’ decision trajectories eﬀectively suggest that most of the participants326
engaged seriously with solving the task. An increasing body of evidence supports the argument327
that web-based behavioural experiments are as reliable as results from the laboratory69;70.328
The diverse eﬀects of social influence on the collective wisdom of a group has been draw-329
ing substantial attention19;21;22;71;72. The bulk of this literature, including many jury models and330
election models45;73, has focused primarily on the static estimation problem, where the ‘truth’ is331
fixed from the outset. However, in reality, there are many situations under which the state of the332
true value is changing over time so that monitoring and tracking the pattern of change is a crucial333
determinant of decision performance74. In such temporally dynamic environments, decision-334
making and learning are coordinated to aﬀect future behavioural outcomes recursively75. Our335
experimental task provides a simple vehicle for exploring collective intelligence in a dynamic336
situation, which encompasses this learning-and-decision-making feedback loop. Potentially, in-337
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tegrating the wisdom of crowds with social learning and collective dynamics research will facil-338
itate the more tractable use of collective intelligence in a temporary changing world.339
In summary, a combination of experimentation and theoretical modelling sheds light onwhen340
groups of individuals will exhibit the wisdom of the crowds and when inflexible herding. Our341
analysis implies that herding is most likely amongst individuals in large groups exposed to chal-342
lenging tasks. That is because challenging tasks lead to greater uncertainty and thereby elicit343
greater conformist learning amongst individuals, whilst rates of copying increase with group344
size. Diﬃcult tasks, by definition, render identification of the optimal behaviour harder, allow-345
ing groups sometimes to converge onmaladaptive outcomes. Conversely, the reduced conformity346
levels of individuals in small groups, and the greater probability that social information would347
be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated ‘wisdom of the crowd’ eﬀects in most other cir-348
cumstances. Our findings provide clear evidence that the conflict between collective intelligence349
and maladaptive herding can be predicted with knowledge of human social learning strategies.350
3 Material and methods351
3.1 Participants352
The experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of St An-353
drews (BL10808). A total of 755 subjects (354 females, 377 males, 2 others and 22 unspecified;354
mean age (1 SD:) = 34.33 (10.9)) participated through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. All partic-355
ipants consented to participation through an online consent form at the beginning of the task.356
We excluded subjects who disconnected to the online task before completing at least the first 30357
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rounds from our computational-model fitting analysis due to unreliability of the model-parameter358
estimation, resulted in 699 subjects (573 subjects entered the group (i.e. N g 2) and 126 entered359
the solitary (i.e. N = 1) condition). The task was only available for individuals who had greater360
than or equal to 90% HIT approval rate and who accessed from the United States. Although361
no sample-size calculation was performed in advance, our parameter recovery test confirmed362
that the sample size was suﬃcient for estimation of individual parameters using a hierarchical363
Bayesian method.364
3.2 Design of the experimental manipulations365
The three uncertainty conditions were: Low-uncertainty condition (diﬀerences between mean366
payoﬀs were 1.264), Moderate-uncertainty condition (diﬀerences between mean payoﬀs were367
0.742) and High-uncertainty condition (diﬀerences between mean payoﬀs were 0.3). The mean368
payoﬀ associated with the ‘excellent’ slot in all three conditions was fixed to 3.1 cents (Supple-369
mentary Figure 1). Each task uncertainty condition was randomly assigned for each diﬀerent HIT370
session, and participants were allowed to participate in one HIT only. Sample size after the data371
exclusion for each uncertainty condition was: N = 113 (Low-uncertainty condition), N = 132372
(Moderate-Uncertain condition), and N = 454 (High-uncertain condition). We assigned more373
sessions to the High-uncertainty condition compared to the other two because we expected that374
larger group sizes would be needed to generate the collective wisdom in noisier environments.375
To manipulate the size of each group, we varied the capacity of the waiting room from 10 to376
30. Because the task was being advertised on the Worker website at AMT for approximately 2377
hours, some participants occasionally arrived after the earlier groups had already started. In that378
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case the participant entered the newly opened waiting room which was open for the next 5 min-379
utes. The number of participants arriving declined with time because newly posted alternative380
HITs were advertised on the top of the task list, which decreased our task’s visibility. This meant381
that a later-starting session tended to begin before reaching maximum room capacity, resulting382
in the smaller group size. Therefore, the actual size diﬀered between groups (Supplementary383
Figure 3, Supplementary Table 1). Data collection and analysis were not performed blind to the384
conditions of the experiments.385
3.3 The multi-player three-armed bandit task386
To study the relationship between social information use and collective behavioural dynamics,387
we focused on a well-established learning-and-decision problem called a ‘multi-armed bandit’388
task, represented here as repeated choices between three slot machines (Supplementary Figure 1,389
Video 1, for detail see Supplementary Method). Participants played the task for 70 rounds. The390
slots paid oﬀ money noisily (in the US cents), varying around two diﬀerent means during the391
first 40 rounds such that there was one ‘good’ slot and two other options giving poorer average392
returns. From the round 41st, however, one of the ‘poor’ slots abruptly increased its mean payoﬀ393
to become ‘excellent’ (i.e. superior to ‘good’). The purpose of this environmental change was394
to observe the eﬀects of maladaptive herding by potentially trapping groups in the out-of-date395
suboptimal (good) slot, as individuals did not know whether or how an environmental change396
would occur. Through making choices and earning a reward from each choice, individuals could397
gradually learn which slot generated the highest rewards.398
In addition to this asocial learning, we provided social information for each member of the399
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group specifying the frequency with which group members chose each slot. All group mem-400
bers played the same task with the same conditions simultaneously, and all individuals had been401
instructed that this was the case, and hence understood that the social information would be in-402
formative.403
Task uncertainty was experimentally manipulated by changing the diﬀerence between the404
mean payoﬀs for the slot machines. In the task with the least uncertainty, the distribution of405
payoﬀs barely overlapped, whilst in the task with the greatest uncertainty the distribution of406
payoﬀs overlapped considerably (Supplementary Figure 1).407
3.4 The computational learning-and-decision-making model408
We modelled individual behavioural processes by assuming that individual i makes a choice for409
option m at round t, in accordance with the choice-probability Pi;t.m/ that is a weighted average410
of social and asocial influences:411
Pi;t.m/ = i;t  Social influencei;m;t + .1 * i;t/  Asocial influencei;m;t; (1)
where i;t is the social learning weight (0 f i;t f 1).412
For the social influence, we assumed a frequency-dependent copying strategy by which an413
individual copies others’ behaviour in accordance with the distribution of social frequency infor-414
mation49–51;55:415
Social influencei;m;t =

Ft*1.m/ + 0:1
i
³
kËoptions

Ft*1.k/ + 0:1
i ; (2)
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where Ft*1.m/ is a number of choices made by other individuals (excluding her/his own choice)416
for the option m in the preceding round t * 1 (t g 2). i is individual i’s conformity exponent,417
*Ø f i f +Ø. When this exponent is larger than zero, higher social influence is given418
to an option which was chosen by more individuals (i.e. positive frequency bias). When this419
exponent is larger than zero (i > 0), higher social influence is aﬀorded to an option chosen420
by more individuals (i.e. positive frequency bias), with conformity bias arising when i > 1,421
such that disproportionally more social influence is given to the most common option28. When422
i < 0, on the other hand, higher social influence is aﬀorded to the option that fewest individuals423
chose in the preceding round t * 1 (i.e. negative frequency bias). To implement the negative424
frequency dependence, we added a small number 0.1 to F so that an option chosen by no one425
(i.e. Ft*1 = 0) could provide the highest social influence when i < 0. Note, there is no social426
influence when i = 0 because in this case the ‘social influence’ favours an uniformly random427
choice, i.e., Si;t.m/ = f 0m_.f 01 +f 02 +f 03 / = 1_3, independent of the social frequency distribution.428
Note also that, in the first round t = 1, we assumed that the choice is only determined by the429
asocial softmax function because there is no social information available.430
For the asocial influence, we used a standard reinforcement learning with ‘softmax’ choice431
rule75, widely applied in human social learning studies e.g.35;51;55. An individual i updates the432
estimated average reward associated with an option m at round t, namely Q-value (Qi;t.m/), ac-433
cording to the Rescorla-Wagner rule as follows:434
Qi;t+1.m/ = Qi;t.m/ + i1.m;mi;t/

ri;t.m/ *Qi;t.m/

; (3)
where i (0 f i f 1) is a learning rate parameter of individual i determining the weight given to435
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new experience and ri;t.m/ is the amount of monetary reward obtained from choosing the option436
m in round t. 1.m;mi;t/ is the binary action-indicator function of individual i, given by437
1.m;mi;t/ =
hnnlnnj
1; if mi;t = m or t = 1,
0; otherwise.
(4)
Therefore, Qi;t.m/ is updated only when the option m was chosen; when the option m was not438
chosen, Qi;t.m/ is not updated (i.e. Qi;t+1.m/ = Qi;t.m/). Note that, only in the first round t = 1,439
all Q-values are updated by using the chosen option’s reward ri;1.m/, so that the individual can440
set a naive ‘intuition’ about the magnitude of reward values she/he would expect to earn from a441
choice in the task; namely, Qi;t=2.1/ = Qi;t=2.2/ = Qi;t=2.3/ = iri;t=1.m/. In practical terms,442
this prevents the model from being overly sensitive to the first experience. Before the first choice,443
individuals had no prior preference for either option (i.e. Qi;1.1/ = Qi;1.2/ = Qi;1.3/ = 0).444
The Q-value is then translated into the asocial influence through the softmax (or logit choice)445
function:446
Ai;t.m/ =
exp

i;tQi;t.m/

³
kËoptions exp

i;tQi;t.k/
 ; (5)
where i;t, called inverse temperature, manipulates individual i’s sensitivity to the Q-values (in447
other words, controlling the proneness to explore). As i;t goes to zero, asocial influence ap-448
proximates to a random choice (i.e. highly explorative). Conversely, if i;t  +Ø, the aso-449
cial influence leads to a deterministic choice in favour of the option with the highest Q-value450
(i.e. highly exploitative). For intermediate values of i;t, individual i exhibits a balance be-451
tween exploration and exploitation35;68. We allowed for the possibility that the balance between452
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exploration-exploitation could change as the task proceeds. To depict such time dependence in453
exploration, we used the equation: i;t = <i;0 + it_70. If the slope i is positive (negative), aso-454
cial influence Ai;t becomes more and more exploitative (explorative) as round t increases. For a455
model fitting purpose, the time-dependent term it is scaled by the total round number 70.456
We allowed that the social learning weight i;t could also change over time as assumed in457
the inverse temperature i;t. To let i;t satisfy the constraint 0 f i;t f 1, we used the following458
sigmoidal function:459
i;t =
1
1 + exp.*.<i;0 + it_70//
: (6)
If the slope i is positive (negative), the social influence increases (decreases) over time. We460
set the social learning weight equal to zero when group size is one (i.e. when an individual461
participated in the task alone and/or when³kËoptions Ft*1.k/ = 0).462
We modelled both the inverse temperature i;t and the social learning weight i;t as a time463
function since otherwise it would be challenging to distinguish diﬀerent patterns of learning in464
this social learning task63. The parameter recovery test confirmed that we were able to diﬀerenti-465
ate such processes under these assumptions (Supplementary Figure 7, Supplementary Figure 8).466
While we also considered the possibility of the conformity exponent being time-dependent (i.e.467
i;t = <i;0 + it_70), the parameter recovery test suggested that the individual slope parameter468
i was not reliably recovered (Supplementary Figure 9), and hence we concentrated our anal-469
ysis on the time-independent i model. We confirmed that instead using the alternative model470
where both social learning parameters were time-dependent (i.e. i;t and i;t) did not qualitatively471
change our results (Supplementary Figure 10).472
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One concern might be the asymmetry between the asocial softmax influence which takes473
many prior experiences into account (depending upon a learning rate) and the social influence474
referring only the most recent frequency information Ft*1. The choice frequency appeared at475
round t is the most reliable social information, compared to the past frequencies, because it could476
be the most ‘updated’ information as long as the other individuals have made informed decisions477
in their best knowledge. In contrast, option’s reward just obtained at t * 1, which was inde-478
pendently and randomly drawn from a probability distribution, is less reliable than accumulated479
Q-values taking past rewards into account. Although many other formulations for asocial and480
social learning processes were possible, we believe that our current choice – time-depth asocial481
reinforcement learning with the most-updated-frequency-dependent copying was a reasonable482
first step.483
In summary, the model has six free parameters that were estimated for each individual human484
participant; namely, i, <i;0, i, <i;0, i, and i. To fit the model, we used a hierarchical Bayesian485
method (HBM), estimating the global means (, <0 , , <0 , , and ) and the global vari-486
ations (, <0 , , <0 , , and ) for each of the three experimental conditions (i.e. the Low-,487
Moderate- and High-uncertain condition), which govern overall distributions of individual pa-488
rameter values. It has become recognised that the HBM can provide more robust and reliable489
parameter estimation than conventional maximum likelihood point estimation in complex cog-490
nitive models76, a conclusion with which our parameter recovery test agreed (Supplementary491
Figure 7, Supplementary Figure 8).492
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3.5 Agent-based model simulation493
We ran a series of individual-based model simulations assuming that a group of individuals play494
our three-armed bandit task for 90 rounds (under theModerate-uncertainty condition) and that in-495
dividuals behave in accordance with the computational learning-and-decision model. We varied496
the group size (n Ë ^3; 10; 30`), themean social learningweight (  Ë ^0:01; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3; :::; 0:9`)497
and the mean conformity exponent (  Ë ^0:5; 1; 3; 6`), running 10,000 replications for each of498
the possible parameter  group size combinations. As for the other parameter values (e.g. the499
asocial reinforcement learning parameters; ; <0 ; ), here we used the experimentally fitted global500
means (Table 2 and Supplementary Table 3). Relaxation of this assumption (i.e. using a diﬀerent501
set of asocial learning parameters) does not qualitatively change our story (Supplementary Fig-502
ure 2). Note that each individual’s parameter values were randomly drawn from the distributions503
centred by the global mean parameter values fixed to each simulation run. Therefore, the actual504
composition of individual parameter values were diﬀerent between individuals even within the505
same social group.506
3.6 Generalised linear mixed models507
To directly analyse the eﬀects of group size and task uncertainty on the time evolution of decision508
performance, we conducted a statistical analysis using a phenomenological model, namely, a509
hidden Markov process logistic regression without assuming any specific learning-and-decision-510
making processes. The dependent valuable was whether the participant chose the best option (1)511
or not (0). The model includes fixed eﬀects of grouping , standardised group size !, and an512
intercept with a random eﬀect of individuals +i. We assumed that the intercept and the eﬀect513
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of grouping change from round to round, as a random walk process. For the eﬀect of group size514
we considered the eﬀect of the 1st environment 1 f t f 40 and that of the 2nd environment,515
namely, !1 and !2, separately.516
To examine whether increasing group size and increasing task uncertainty aﬀected individ-517
ual use of the positive frequency-dependent copying strategy, we used a hierarchical Bayesian518
logistic regression model with a random eﬀect of groups. The dependent valuable was whether519
the participant used the positive frequency-dependent copying (1) or not (0). The model includes520
fixed eﬀects of group size (standardised), task uncertainty (0: Low, 0.5: Moderate, 1: High), age521
(standardised), gender (0: male, 1: female, NA: others or unspecified), and possible two-way522
interactions between these fixed eﬀects.523
We also investigated the eﬀects of both group size and the task’s uncertainty on the fitted524
values of the learning parameters. We used a hierarchical Bayesian gaussian regression model525
predicting the individual fitted parameter values. The model includes eﬀects of group size (stan-526
dardised), task uncertainty (0: Low, 0.5: Moderate, 1: High), age (standardised), gender (0:527
male, 1: female, NA: others or unspecified), and two-way interactions between these fixed ef-528
fects. We assumed that the variance of the individual parameter values might be contingent upon529
task uncertainty because we had found in the computational model-fitting result that the fitted530
global variance parameters (i.e. <0 ,  and ) were larger in more uncertain conditions (Sup-531
plementary Table 2).532
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3.7 Statistical analysis533
We used a hierarchical Bayesian method (HBM) to estimate the free parameters of our sta-534
tistical models, including both the phenomenological regression model and the computational535
learning-and-decision-making model. The HBM allows us to estimate individual diﬀerences,536
while ensures these individual variations are bounded by the group-level global parameters. The537
HBM was performed under Stan 2.16.2 (http://mc-stan.org) in R 3.4.1 (https://www.538
r-project.org) software. The models contained at least 4 parallel chains and we confirmed539
convergence of theMCMC using both the Gelman-Rubin statistics and the eﬀective sample sizes.540
Full details of the model fitting procedure and prior assumptions are shown in the appendix.541
3.7.1 Parameter recovery test542
To check the validity of our model-fitting method, we conducted a ‘parameter recovery test’543
so as to examine how well our model fitting procedure had been able to reveal true individual544
parameter values. To do this, we generated synthetic data by running a simulation with the545
empirically fitted global parameter values, and then re-fitted the model with this synthetic data546
using the same procedure. The parameter recovery test showed that the all true global parameter547
values were fallen into the 95% Bayesian credible interval (Supplementary Figure 7), and at least548
93% of the true individual parameter values were correctly recovered (i.e. 96% of i, 93% of <i;0,549
95% of i, 97% of <i;0, 96% of i and 97% of i values were fallen into the 95% Bayesian CI.550
Supplementary Figure 7).551
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3.7.2 Categorisation of individual learning strategies552
Based on the 50% CI of the individual conformity exponent parameter values i, we divided553
the participants into the following three diﬀerent social learning strategies. If her/his 50% CI554
of i fell above zero (lower > 0), below zero (upper < 0) or including zero (lower f 0 f555
upper), she/he was categorised as a ‘positive frequency-dependent copier’, a ‘negative frequency-556
dependent copier’, or a ‘random choice individual’, respectively. We used the 50~ Bayesian CI557
to conduct this categorisation instead of using the more conservative 95~ CI because the latter558
would cause much higher rates of ‘false negatives’, by which an individual who applied either a559
positive frequency-dependent copying or a negative-frequency dependent copying strategy was560
falsely labelled as an asocial random choice individual (Supplementary Figure 7). Four hundred561
agents out of 572 (ù 70~) were falsely categorised as a random choice learner in the recovery562
test when we used the 95% criterion (Supplementary Figure 7). On the other hand, the 50%563
CI criterion seemed to be much better in terms of the false negative rate which was only 18.5%564
(i.e. 106 agents), although it might be slightly worse in terms of ‘false positives’: Thirty-seven565
agents (6.5%) were falsely labelled as either a positive frequency-dependent copier or a negative-566
frequency dependent copier by the 50% CI, whereas the false positive rate of the 95% CI was567
only 0.2% (Supplementary Figure 7). To balance the risk of false positives and false negatives,568
we decided to use the 50% CI which seemed to have more strategy detecting power.569
3.7.3 The post-hoc model simulation570
So as to evaluate how accurately our model can generate observed decision pattern in our task571
setting, we ran a series of individual-based model simulation using the fitted individual param-572
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eter values (i.e. means of the individual posterior distributions) for each group size for each573
uncertainty condition. At the first step of the simulation, we assigned a set of fitted parameters574
of a randomly-chosen experimental subject from the same group size and the same uncertain575
condition to an simulated agent, until the number of agents reaches the simulated group size. We576
allowed duplicate choice of experimental subject in this parameter assignment. At the second577
step, we let this synthetic group of agents play the bandit task for 90 rounds. We repeated these578
steps 10,000 times for each group size, task uncertainty.579
3.8 Data availability580
Both experimental and simulation data are available on an online repository (https://github.581
com/WataruToyokawa/ToyokawaWhalenLaland2018).582
3.9 Code availability583
The browser based online task was built by Node.js (https://nodejs.org/en/) and socket.io584
(https://socket.io), and the code are available on a GitHub repository (https://github.585
com/WataruToyokawa/MultiPlayerThreeArmedBanditGame). Analyses were conducted in586
R (https://www.r-project.org) and simulations of individual based models were conducted587
inMathematica (https://www.wolfram.com), both are available on an online repository (https:588
//github.com/WataruToyokawa/ToyokawaWhalenLaland2018).589
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Figure 1: Findings of the individual-based model showing the eﬀects of social information use on the average
decision accuracy over replications. The x-axis gives the round and y-axis gives the proportion of individuals
expected to choose the optimal slot (i.e. decision accuracy) averaged over all replications. The vertical dashed line
indicates the timing of environmental (i.e. payoﬀ) change (at t = 41). Diﬀerent group sizes are shown by diﬀerent
styles (black (dotted): n = 3, orange (dashed): n = 10, red (solid): n = 30). We set the average slopes for the social
learning weight to be equal to zero for the sake of simplicity; namely,  = 0. Other free parameter values (i.e.  ,
<0 ,  , , <0 ,  ,  ,  and ) are best approximates to the experimental fitted values (see Table 2 and
Supplementary Table 1).
Figure 2: Results from the individual-based model simulations showing the distribution of each group’s mean
accuracy before environmental change (t f 40). The x-axis gives the mean decision accuracy over the first 40
rounds (i.e. the environment 1) for each replication. Diﬀerent group sizes are shown by diﬀerent styles (black
(dotted): n = 3, orange (dashed): n = 10, red (solid): n = 30). The other free parameter values are the same as in
Figure 1.
Table 1: The mean and the 95% Bayesian credible intervals of the posterior for the group size eﬀect at the
phenomenological logistic model
Low Uncertainty Moderate Uncertainty High Uncertainty
!1 0.08 [-0.15, 0.33] 0.10 [-0.06, 0.26] 0.07 [0.00, 0.15]
!2 0.67 [0.44, 0.91] -0.26 [-0.44, -0.11] -0.10 [-0.17, -0.02]
Note: All R values are 1.0 and the eﬀective sample sizes are larger than 837.
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Figure 3: Time evolutions and distributions of decision performance for each condition. A: The average
decision accuracies of the experimental participants (red: large groups, orange: small groups, dark grey: lone
individuals). All individual performances were averaged within the same size category (solid lines). The
light-shaded areas, dark-shaded areas, and dashed curves show the 95%, 50%, and median Bayesian credible
intervals of the phenomenological, time-series logistic regression. Sample sizes for large, small, and lone groups
are: N = 43,N = 44 andN = 38 for the Low-uncertainty condition;N = 52,N = 56 andN = 37 for the
Moderate-uncertainty condition; andN = 259,N = 168 andN = 58 for the High-uncertainty condition,
respectively. B: Change in the main eﬀect of the dummy variable of grouping on the decision accuracy at the
phenomenological regression model. The shaded areas are the Bayesian CIs and solid curves are the median. C, D:
Change and distribution in average decision accuracy of the individual-based post-hoc simulations of the learning
process model using the experimentally fit parameter values. C: All replications were averaged within the same size
category (solid lines). The shaded areas give the 50% quantiles. The experimental horizon (i.e. t = 70) is indicated
by the vertical line. D: Performance was averaged within prior- and post-change periods for each replication for
each group sizes category.
Figure 4: Model fitting for the three diﬀerent task’s uncertain conditions (the Low-, Moderate- and
High-uncertainty) and the diﬀerent group size. Three diﬀerent learning strategies are shown in diﬀerent styles
(red-triangle: positive frequency-dependent learning, blue-circle: negative frequency-dependent learning;
grey-circle: nearly random choice strategy). (A) Frequencies of three diﬀerent learning strategies. Note that a sum
of the frequencies of these three strategies in the same group size does not necessarily equal to 1, because there are a
small number of individuals eliminated from this analysis due to insuﬃcient data. (B) Estimated social learning
weight, and (C) estimated conformity exponent, for each individual shown for each learning strategy. The 50~
Bayesian CIs of the fitted GLMMs are shown by dashed lines and shaded areas. The horizontal lines in (C) show a
region *1 < i < 1. Sample sizes for Negative Frequency Dependent, Positive Frequency Dependent, and Random
Choice strategies are: N = 2,N = 61 andN = 14 for the Low-uncertainty condition;N = 3,N = 80 andN = 15
for the Moderate-uncertainty condition; andN = 32,N = 260 andN = 106 for the High-uncertainty condition,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Change in fitted values (i.e. median of the Bayesian posterior distribution) of the social learning
weight i;t with time for each Positive Frequency Dependent individual, for each level of task uncertainty.
Thick dashed lines are the median values of i;t across the subjects for each uncertainty condition. Individual
conformity exponent values i are shown in diﬀerent colours (higher i is darker). Sample size for each task
uncertainty condition is: N = 61 (Low-uncertainty),N = 80 (Moderate-uncertainty) andN = 260
(High-uncertainty).
Table 2: The mean and the 95% Bayesian credible intervals of the posterior global means for the parameter values.
The number of participants (N) for each experimental condition are also shown.
Groups Solitary individuals
Uncertainty: Low Moderate High Low Moderate High
< (learning rate) 0.99 0.90 0.61 0.85 -0.17 0.46
[0.34, 1.73] [0.43, 1.44] [0.21, 1.03] [-0.07, 1.95] [-1.27, 0.89] [-0.39, 1.36]
<0 (inv. temp.) 1.84 1.68 1.38 1.10 1.44 0.85
[1.15, 2.70] [1.25, 2.18] [1.16, 1.62] [0.69, 1.54] [0.80, 2.07] [0.46, 1.22]
 (inv. temp.) 3.70 3.01 2.97 2.39 2.81 2.27
[1.98, 5.71] [1.88, 4.27] [2.37, 3.60] [1.46, 3.53] [1.64, 4.07] [1.40, 3.31]
<0 (soc. wight) -1.55 -2.37 -2.16 – – –
[-2.71, -0.71] [-4.12, -1.01] [-2.81, -1.63] – – –
 (soc. wight) -1.39 -1.55 -1.87 – – –
[-2.66, -0.03] [-4.29, 0.91] [-3.04, -0.81] – – –
 (conformity coeﬀ.) 1.65 3.00 2.67 – – –
[0.83, 2.82] [1.57, 4.85] [1.80, 3.73] – – –
N 77 98 398 36 34 56
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